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By MCH NARA Date 1/2/95

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TO: The Secretary
The Under Secretary

THROUGH: S/S
J - The Under Secretary for Political Affairs

FROM: EA - Ambassador Brown

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting April 30 - Policy Toward Japan:
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

NSSM 5 reviews all major issues in US policy toward Japan. Attached are a Summary (Tab A) and the basic paper (Tab B). Important portions of the Summary are underlined.

The main subject for discussion at the NSC will be Okinawa. It is recommended you take the following positions:

1. Timing of Okinawa Reversion (page 4 of Summary)

It is recommended you support the first option on page 4, "Provided there is agreement in 1969 on the essential elements governing post-reversion U.S. military use, agree to reversion in 1972 if negotiations are completed at that time." Most of the NSC membership will support this.

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The second option, by which the US would agree this year to reversion and to enter into negotiations with reversion taking place when the negotiations are completed, does not meet the Japanese political requirement. The Japanese have made it clear that in their view reversion should take place no later than 1972. We agree that after 1972 reversion pressure might become dangerous. If we can agree this year on the military rights we need (Option 1), we would have two years to negotiate all the implementing arrangements and still meet the Japanese need for actual reversion in 1972. The precise date in 1972 can be worked out later.

2. Nuclear Storage on Okinawa (page 5 of Summary)

It is our view that it would be most difficult for Japan to agree to our continued nuclear storage on Okinawa after reversion, and the Japanese Government could probably not get Diet and public support if it did agree. There is, however, some possibility, though admittedly slight of getting emergency rights to bring in nuclear weapons. Therefore we recommend you support option 3, "emergency rights to bring in nuclear weapons".

The JCS will opt for option 1 - continued nuclear storage after reversion. We do not think this is politically possible, and we are not sure that denial of nuclear weapons on Okinawa would mean a significant weakening of our nuclear deterrent or nuclear capability in the area. Page 23 of NSSM 5 sets out the difference between State/ISA and the JCS on the effect of denial of nuclear weapons on Okinawa.

As a negotiating tactic, we would of course stress to Japanese leaders this year that denial of nuclear weapons would weaken our capability and deterrence.

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3. Conventional Military Combat Operations (page 6 of Summary). We recommend option 3, "Limited free use of bases for key areas, such as Korea and Taiwan, covering both our bases in Japan and Okinawa." We should make a strong effort to get from the Japanese better rights than apply to our bases in Japan today, the so-called homeland level. We think the Japanese will be prepared to make concessions in this area, especially if we eventually give up our right of continued nuclear storage. Although the JCS will opt for option 1 - complete free use of Okinawa to launch combat operations after reversion, we do not think it is feasible to get complete rights to use Okinawa bases after reversion for all non-nuclear contingencies; there is, for example, already Japanese and Okinawan objection to our use of Okinawa for B-52s bombing Vietnam. But we do think we can get broad understandings from the Japanese, which might be made public in part, giving us free use for key areas such as Korea and Taiwan. We should also seek an understanding that we can continue to use our Okinawa bases to support our operations in Vietnam.

The Japanese have suggested that we try to list the contingencies which might be covered by an understanding that Japan would give the US advance approval under the prior consultation formula.

4. Other Political and Economic Issues

As indicated in the Summary (Tab A), there was agreement within the Review Group on the issues of US-Japan Security Treaty (page 2 of Summary) and US Bases in Japan (page 3). There was also agreement by all agencies except Treasury on Japan's Defense Effort (pages 7-8) that Alternative 2 is preferable, i.e. to continue current policy of encouraging Japan's development of its defense forces without exerting pressure

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for substantially large forces. We support Alternative 2. We share Treasury's desire that Japan bear a more equitable share of our partnership and much of the paper is aimed at this objective. But bringing pressure on Japan to rearm is undesirable.

We also agree with the Review Group's recommendation that the NSC not focus on these issues at its forthcoming meeting but concentrate on Okinawa and directly related security issues.

Concurrences: C - Mr. McHenry J/PM - Mr. Ausland

Attachments:

Tab A - Summary (with Top Secret attachment)
Tab B - Basic Paper

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